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I.

Ethical Challenges in a Changing Profession

In little more than four decades,2 the field of American legal ethics has been transformed
from an unimportant backwater into a mighty river of legal principles that drives the practice of
law in countless respects. Today, this complex matrix of substantive provisions and enforcement
mechanisms ensures, to a great extent, that clients are protected from unnecessary harm, that
lawyers are safeguarded from improper accusations,3 and that the provision of legal services is
consistent with the public interest.
However, the fabric of legal ethics is threatened by a looming transformation of the legal
profession.4 That potential restructuring may revolutionize the delivery of legal services by
replacing what is essentially a unified5 American legal profession that has monopoly powers and
corresponding responsibilities with a diverse range of legal services providers, some of whom
may not be lawyers at all,6 others of whom may not be fully licensed,7 and none of whom will
enjoy an exclusive franchise. Such changes, if they come to pass, will undercut the foundations
upon which the law of modern legal ethics is founded. It will then be necessary to reconstitute
an effective legal ethics regime for a world of disaggregated legal services.

A. Basic Assumptions and Established Practices
The current model of American legal ethics is animated by three important assumptions,
each of which is now under attack. The first is that legal services are ordinarily provided only by
fully licensed lawyers.8 The second is that lawyers are members of an exclusive profession9
2

See Part II.
For example, the legal malpractice principles under the law of negligence protect lawyers from liability based on
the reasonable exercise of judgment. A lawyer cannot be held liable merely because some other lawyer would have
charted a different course in dealing with complex facts or uncertain legal principles. A lawyer may be found to be
negligent only if the lawyer did what no reasonable lawyer could have done or failed to do what every reasonable
lawyer was obliged to do. See Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex. 1989) (“If an attorney makes a
decision which a reasonably prudent attorney could make in the same or similar circumstance, it is not an act of
negligence even if the result is undesirable.”).
4
See Part III.
5
The legal profession in other parts of the world is different. See Steven Alan Childress, Lawyers, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 930, 934 (David S. Clark, ed. 2007)
(“Many countries do not share any broad and unifying conception of the legal profession or do not have a clear and
formal definition of legal practice as does the United States.”).
6
See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 891, 892-94
(2009) (arguing that the “increase in nonlawyer delivery of what have traditionally been seen as legal services . . . is
a trend that . . . is destined only to accelerate” and providing examples).
7
See Debra Cassens Weiss, In Washington State, “Legal Technicians” Will Be Allowed to Help Civil Litigants,
A.B.A. J., Jun. 19, 2012 (“Washington State’s top court has approved a new rule [effective September 1, 2012]
allowing licensed legal technicians to help civil litigants navigate the court system”).
8
One indication that the legal profession’s monopoly over the provision of legal services is being challenged is the
difficulty that the organized bar encounters in attempting to enforce provisions against the unauthorized practice of
law. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999)
(vacating an injunction against the sale of Quicken Family Lawyer software because, after the trial court ruled, the
Texas legislature passed a statute “providing that ‘the “practice of law” does not include the design, creation,
publication, distribution, display, or sale ... [of] computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and
conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney’”); see also THOMAS D.
MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 77-78 (2010) (“When the State Bar of Texas tried to enjoin
accounting firm Arthur Andersen from providing what were arguably legal services, . . . the Bar ultimately had to

3
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which is subject to special obligations both to clients and the public.10 And the third is that entry
into the legal profession requires extensive educational preparation during which all new lawyers
are introduced to fundamentals, including the rules of professional responsibility.
Today, all lawyers in any American jurisdictions must comply with a mandatory ethics
11
code, which regulates both on-the-job and off-the-job conduct.12 With limited immunities,13
those same lawyers are also subject to malpractice liability under basic legal standards,14 such as
the principles of negligence15 and fiduciary duty.16 There are other enforcement mechanisms

give up for lack of funds.”); Jonathan J. Bates, Say No to High Court Endorsement of Pro Se Forms, TEX. LAWYER,
Aug. 6, 2012 (arguing that “the Texas Supreme Court should not give its imprimatur to legal forms for pro se
litigants).
9
See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 20 (asserting that the “use of the idea of a ‘profession’ to understand the world of
lawyers obstructs clear thinking about what lawyers actually do and how they are likely to have to respond to the
world they face”); id. at 21 (“lawyers in America are not now a profession and—over most of their history—they
never have been one”); id. at 55-56 (“the American view of law as a profession is at most a little more than a century
old and, more realistically, a project of the 1950s and 1980s”). But see Neil Hamilton, The Profession and
Professionalism Are Dead?: A Review of Thomas Morgan, the Vanishing American Lawyer (2010), 20 PROF. LAW.
14, 14 (2010) (challenging the idea that that the concepts of “profession” and “professionalism” are dead, even
though “we could do a great deal better in realizing them”).
10
See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 966
(2009) (arguing that “what lawyers do is a ‘limited agency,’ which requires serving constituencies other than clients
and striking a balance between loyalty to clients and loyalties to the legal system and the public.”).
11
See Business Organizations—Professions, Rules of Professional Responsibility (Statutes),
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/Blob/Iaa42991f5ae711de9b8c850332338889.pdf?targetType=surveysstatpdf&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentImage&contextData=(sc.Histor
y*oc.Search) (last visited July 18, 2012) (offering a detailed fifty-one jurisdiction compilation).
12
See Margaret Raymond, Professional Responsibility for the Pro Se Attorney, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. &
ETHICS 1, 6 (2011) (“Professional responsibility rules can effectively be divided into two categories: rules that apply
to lawyers when they are acting in the role of lawyer, and rules that apply to all lawyers at all times, regardless of
whether those lawyers are engaged in the practice of law.”).
13
For example, lawyers who represent criminal defendants are largely immunized from malpractice liability by the
rule that requires a convicted client to prove exoneration or innocence as a condition to suing for malpractice. See
Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC L. REV. 43, 63-69 (2008).
In virtually all states, lawyers enjoy absolute immunity for communications that are made in the regular
course of judicial proceedings. Cf. Bochetto v. Bigson, 860 A. 2d 67, 72-73 (Pa. 2004) (holding that the publication
of material in an allegedly defamatory complaint filed with a trial court was absolutely privileged, but that the faxing
of a copy of the complaint to a news reporter was only potentially qualifiedly privileged).
In some jurisdictions, public defenders are often protected from malpractice liability by some form of
absolute or qualified statutory immunity. See, e.g., Osborne v. Goodlet, No. M2003-03118-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL
1713868, *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2005) (finding that a public defender was absolutely immune under a state
statute which provided that “[s]tate officers and employees are absolutely immune from liability for acts or
omissions within the scope of the officers or employee’s office or employment, except for willful, malicious, or
criminal acts or omissions or for acts or omissions done for personal gain” and under another statute which provided
that “[n]o court in this state has any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit against . . . any public
defender . . . for any act of negligence”); see also Powell v. Wood Cnty. Comm’n, 550 S.E.2d 617, 620-21 (W. Va.
2001) (holding that a statute conferring immunity on court-appointed criminal defense counsel logically required a
county to indemnify appointed counsel with respect to costs incurred in defending against a malpractice claim).
14
But see Leigh Jones, Survey Maps Malpractice Law from Sea to Shining Sea, NAT’L L.J., July 13, 2012 (“All
states recognize a claim of legal malpractice as a claim sounding in tort, contract or both — except Alabama. In
Alabama, a claim for legal malpractice exists only under statute, the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act.”).
15
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (2000) (discussing professional negligence).
16
See, e.g., Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. 2002) (“Our courts have long
recognized that certain fiduciary duties are owed by . . . an attorney to a client.”). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (discussing breach of fiduciary duty).
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such as fee forfeiture,17 civil sanctions,18 criminal penalties,19 and exacting judicial scrutiny of
lawyer-client contracts20 and transactions.21 It is nevertheless indisputable that professional
discipline and malpractice lawsuits form the essential backbone of modern legal ethics.
If the practice of law fragments and the now-unified profession is replaced by diverse
specialized legal callings, it will be difficult or impossible for discipline and malpractice to play
the same critical role in guiding the conduct of, and holding accountable, the persons who serve
clients as legal advisors and learned intermediaries. This is true because in a less unified
professional world it will be more difficult to frame an appropriate standard of care for
malpractice actions, less likely that there will be comprehensively developed ethics codes for
each variety of practice, and harder to insist that the practice of law is a fiduciary, rather than a
market-place, endeavor.22

B. Professional Accountability and Regulatory Effectiveness
The basic architecture of American legal ethics is now so well established, so firmly in
place, that is difficult to consider that the entire structure may be in jeopardy. Moreover, it is
hard to doubt the durability of the current legal ethics regime because the relevant rules and
23

17

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (discussing fee forfeiture based on
“clear and serious violation of duty” to a client). But see Jeffrey A. Webb & Blake Stribling, Ten Years After
Burrow v. Arce, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 967, 972 (2009) (“[F]orfeiture, while sought with increasing regularity in recent
years, has not actually been awarded in the vast majority of those instances.”).
18
See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 431-32 (8th ed. 2009)
(discussing the dramatic increase in judicial sanctions of lawyers over the past three decades because of the 1983
implementation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.); see also Stephen D. Brody & David K.
Roberts, The Ethical Difficulties of Court-Ordered Inspections of Social Networking Accounts, 225 PLI/NY 249,
263 (2012) (discussing a Virginia case where an attorney and his client were sanctioned for intentionally deleting
damaging Facebook photographs that the opposing party had requested); Lester v. Allied Concrete Co., 80 Va. Cir.
454 (2010) (ordering monetary sanctions).
19
See Chad Bray, Ex-NY Lawyer Pleads Guilty In Client Theft, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 3, 2012, 5:38 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/05/03/ex-ny-lawyer-pleads-guilty-in-client-theft/ (discussing a guilty pleas arising
from theft of nearly $140,000 from long-time clients).
20
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18 (2000) (discussing client-lawyer contracts);
see also James M. “Jamie” Parker, Jr. & J.K. Leonard, Why Your Secretary Is Really Worth a Million Dollars:
Exploring the Harsh Penalty for Not Proofreading Your Fee Agreements in Anglo-Dutch Petroleum v. Greenberg
Peden, 2 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 104, 132 (2012) (discussing whether, in the context of lawyer
fee agreements, the requirement of “reasonable clarity actually means something closer to strict liability”).
21
See, e.g., Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007) (holding that business transactions with clients that are
not standard commercial dealings are presumptively fraudulent); McMahon v. Eke-Nweke, 503 F. Supp. 2d 598
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying summary judgment to a lawyer, in a client’s breach of a fiduciary duty action, because
there was a question of fact as to whether the client had been informed of all material circumstances related to the
lease of space by the client to the lawyer); see also Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients,
34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 737, 772 (2003) (indicating that business transaction between a lawyer and client “will not
survive scrutiny unless the lawyer proves that the highest standards of disclosure and fair dealing were observed.”).
22
See Part IV-B.
23
For example, there are no less than twenty textbooks on attorney professional responsibility currently published
by the five major law book presses (Aspen, Carolina Academic Press, Foundation Press, LexisNexis, and West).
While some authors uniquely define the relevant substantive material (see, e.g., DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, R.
MICHAEL CASSIDY, & JUDITH A. MCMORROW, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2nd ed.
2010) (focusing on moral development and virtue)), the topics covered in most textbooks suggest that there is an
established “canon” that defines what constitutes the law of professional responsibility (which includes, among a
host of widely shared topics, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, competence, client perjury, and attorney disclosure
obligations).
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processes seem to work reasonably well, probably better than at any point in American history,24
and often better than in other countries.25
Today, in the United States, errant lawyers routinely are held accountable for their
misconduct.26 Aggrieved clients have a fair chance at compensation via actions for damages or
restitution,27 if they have meritorious claims.28 Moreover, the legal system generally operates
honestly and in accordance with established legal principles. Judicial decisions are usually based
on legitimate factors aired in adversarial settings, not on personal relationships,29 bribes,30 secret
communications,31 or political manipulation.32 The public expects lawyers33 and judges34 who

24

Cf. David Gialanella, Technology Credited With Hike in Disposition of Ethics Cases, N.J. L.J., July 6, 2012 (“The
[New Jersey] Disciplinary Review Board adjudicated and docketed more cases in 2011 than it had in any year since
the mid-2000s, thanks largely to increased technological efficiency.”).
25
See, e.g., Katarina Lewinbuk, Perestroika or Just Perfunctory? The Scope and Significance of Russia's New Legal
Ethics Laws, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 25, 77-79 (2010) (discussing obstacles to an effective legal ethics regime in Russia);
William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found: Searching for Legal Professionalism in the People’s Republic of
China, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA 287, 292-93 (William P. Alford ed.
2007) (discussing widespread corruption of legal processes in China and noting that “the expansion of the Chinese
bar has been accomplished by increasing corruption, with lawyers at times a conduit for, if not the instigators of,
such behavior”).
26
See Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and Statistics, 35 J.
LEG. PROF. 209 (2011) (offering detailed state-by-state statistical information for the years 1998 through 2008 on
grievances filed, resulting formal charges, and discipline imposed); see also State Bar of Texas Commission for
Lawyer Discipline, Annual Report: June 1, 2010 – May 31, 2011 (2011), available at
http://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForLawyers/GrievanceInfoandEthicsHelpline/CDCAnnualReport.pdf (last visited July 16, 2012) (gathering statistics on lawyer discipline in Texas).
27
The completion of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) seems certain to
invigorate thinking about remedies for lawyer misconduct. “Restitution is a remedy which measures the plaintiff’s
entitlement to redress based not on what the plaintiff lost (damages), but on what the defendant improperly gained.”
VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 260 (2011).
28
Of course, the obstacles to proving that one has a meritorious malpractice action are formidable, including the
difficult “trial-within-a-trial” causation requirement. See Suder v. Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP, 992 A.2d 413,
420 (Md. 2010) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b (2000), which
provides that “[a]ll the issues that would have been litigated in the previous action are litigated between the plaintiff
and the plaintiff’s former lawyer, with the latter taking the place and bearing the burdens that properly would have
fallen on the defendant in the original action.”); see also Leigh Jones, Survey Maps Malpractice Law from Sea to
Shining Sea, NAT’L L.J., July 13, 2012 (quoting the editor of A 50-State Survey of Legal Malpractice Law, published
by the American Bar Association, as stating that “in virtually every state, the element of causation is determined by
the case-within-a-case test . . . . While Louisiana employs that test, the burden is placed on the attorney to prove that
the plaintiff would not have prevailed. It seemingly shifts the burden to the attorney to disprove causation.”); Jeffrie
D. Boysen, Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proof on Causation in Legal Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY’S J.
LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 308, 311 (2011) (discussing a “significant minority of jurisdictions” that allow the burden
of proof on causation to shift under some circumstances).
29
See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 720-23
(1999) (contrasting American practices with the Chinese tradition of using “guanxi”—gifts and special
relationships—to influence official decisions); see also In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 2000 WL 19451 (Mo. 2000)
(suspending a judge who should have recused himself from a case involving daughter of a mayor, with whom judge
had a dispute); Matter of Eplin, 416 S.E.2d 248, (W. Va.1992) (suspending a judge who accorded special treatment
to a criminal defendant in order to gain the favor of an elected official); Mary Pat Gallagher, Judge Who Helped
Girlfriend in Legal Case Denies Wrongdoing, N.J. L.J., June 25, 2012 (describing ethics charges against a judge).
30
But see Assoc. Press, More Judicial Corruption Emerges, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 2, 2012, at A12
(“A dozen people, half lawyers, have been indicted as part of a federal probe into what some observers call the most
wide spread case of judicial corruption they’ve ever seen.”).
31
See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 (2012) (prohibiting ex parte communications); In re Henriksen, C.J. Nos.
1 & 2, 2011, 2012 WL 1672242 (Del. May 3, 2012) (upholding removal of a judge based in part on improper ex
parte communications); In re Cotton, 939 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ind. 2010) (suspending an attorney who made an
improper ex parte communication and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); see also
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fall short of the standards of conduct to be held accountable,35 and typically those expectations
are not disappointed. 36

C.

New Realities

The question then is this: what happens to American legal ethics if the foundational
assumptions change? How will clients be protected, and how will the administration of justice
operate legitimately, if legal services are not only provided by lawyers, if legal services providers
are not treated as members of the profession, or if the practice of law is not preceded by
extensive professional education? Can anything replace disciplinary and malpractice actions as
vehicles for deterring bad practices and holding malefactors accountable?
This article examines the options for restructuring legal ethics if the American legal
profession changes in fundamental ways that make it difficult or impossible for negligence and
fiduciary-duty malpractice principles and legal ethics codes to play the same important roles they
currently perform.37 Part II briefly discusses the recent history and current state of American
legal ethics. Part III considers why and how the American legal profession may fundamentally
change in the near future, with particular reference to Professor Thomas D. Morgan’s recent
book, The Vanishing American Lawyer.38 Part IV evaluates the main nonprofessional option for
regulating the conduct of legal services providers who are either not fully licensed or not lawyers
at all, namely the legal principles governing contracts. Part V offers concluding thoughts about
Vincent R. Johnson, Corruption in Education, A Global Legal Problem, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2008)
(discussing the dangers posed by ex parte communications in academic contexts).
32
But see Justice in Jeopardy, 2003 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST
CENTURY JUDICIARY, at 31-36, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.authcheckdam.pdf (describing “a
number of recent episodes in which altercations between the political branches and their respective judiciaries have
culminated in threats to the judiciary's budget or jurisdiction or in other proposals to exert greater control over the
judiciary as an institution”). For a comparative perspective, see Vincent Robert Johnson, The French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, 13 BOSTON
COLL. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1989) (describing how the abuses perpetrated by the Revolutionary Tribunal
of Paris during the French Revolution were caused in part by political interference with the performance of judicial
duties).
33
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Longino, 945 N.E.2d 1040 (Ohio 2011) (ordering disbarment of an attorney for
misappropriating settlement funds, forging signatures, and supplying false information).
34
See, e.g., Mary Pat Gallagher, Discipline Sought for Judge Who Acquitted Acquaintance on Ticket, N.J. L.J., July
12, 2012 (reporting that a former municipal judge faced “censure and banishment from the bench for allegedly
fixing a traffic ticket for his daughter's ex-teacher”).
35
See David Gialanella, N.J. Attorney Ethics Complaints Keep on Rising, N.J. L.J., July 31, 2012 (discussing recent
statistics); see alsoVincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J.
717, 724 (1999) (“Americans today expect that the law can, should, and will be used to ensure that a level playing
field in public life exists by eliminating, insofar as possible, any unfair advantage that might be gained through the
use of special connections to those who exercise the power of government.”).
36
See, e.g., R. Robin McDonald, Judge Parrott Retires When JQC Launches Ethics Probe, DAILY REPORT, May 22,
2012 (discussing alleged abuse of the prestige of judicial office); Embattled N. Georgia Magistrate Resigns, DAILY
REPORT, Aug. 17, 2012 (discussing a judge’s resignation following an investigation into whether he distributed presigned, blank arrest and search warrants to police officers); see also The Hot Seat: Lawyers and Judges in Trouble,
www.law.com (July 18, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202561519667&slreturn=20120620151747
(collecting numerous news stories about allegedly unethical conduct by lawyers and judges).
37
See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 25, 29-40 (2000) (discussing how legal ethics codes protect clients, foster equality of treatment,
promote ethical discourse, perform an important declarative function, and facilitate re-examination of ethical
choices).
38
MORGAN, supra note 7.
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whether those principles, together with laws against deception (tort actions for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices laws), can effectively ensure that
diverse legal services providers act in a manner consistent with the best interests of clients and
the proper administration of justice.

II.

The Rise and Reach of the Current Regime
A. The Clark Report and Watergate

It is important to remember that the modern American legal ethics is a relatively recent
invention, not even fifty years old.39 The revolution began in earnest with the work of an
American Bar Association committee chaired by former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark.40
In 1970, that committee declared that lawyer disciplinary processes were scandalously deficient
and required immediate attention.41 Followed soon by the Watergate Crisis, which exposed
widespread lawyer wrongdoing at the highest levels of government,42 the Clark Report catalyzed
a professional restructuring that is still underway.43 Thirty years into that process, the reform
efforts reached a plateau with the American Law Institute’s promulgation of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.44 That work of professional scholarship left no doubt
about the importance of legal ethics as an area of contemporary American law.

B. The Legal Ethics Revolution
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see how thoroughly the field of legal
ethics was transformed during the past half century. In vivid contrast to the era that ended in
39

Of course, the roots of American legal ethics go much deeper. See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY
(1836); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW
(1854); see also MICHAEL S. ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 184-87 (2011) (discussing the
development of ethical standards in Texas); Michael S. Ariens, Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 343, 349-451 (2008) (discussing American legal ethics from the 1800’s to early twenty-first century); Carol
Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1454 (2004)
(“The basic elements of the medieval provisions—fairness in litigation, competence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees, and public service—continue to be the central principles of modern legal ethics.”); Thomas L.
Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “Technical” Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer as Friend, 14 CLINICAL L.
REV. 337, 340-45 (2007) (discussing Hoffman and Sharswood). However, until recent times, attorney standards of
conduct were never broadly enforced through a wide range of legal sanctions, including those imposed by
professional discipline and legal malpractice actions.
40
See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL. PROF. 33, 35
(2005) (“The Report was the starting point in a revolution which, over ensuing decades, has wholly reshaped the
field of legal ethics.”); see also MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: A LIFE OF
SERVICE 249-51 (2009) (discussing the work of the Clark Committee).
41
See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (Final Draft 1970) (“After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout
the country, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention
of the profession.”).
42
See Kathleen Clark, Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 673 (2000) (quoting
former White House counsel John Dean as stating, “[H]ow in God's name could so many lawyers get involved in
something like this?”).
43
See Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate, ABA J., June 2012, at 36, 42 (quoting John Dean as stating,
“When I took the elective course in ethics at law school, it was one-quarter of a credit. Legal ethics and
professionalism played almost no role in any lawyer’s mind, including mine. Watergate changed that—for me and
every other lawyer.”).
44
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
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1970, attorney professional responsibility is now the subject of required law school courses, 45
bar examinations,46 academic specialization,47 continuing education programs,48 burgeoning
literature,49 advisory resources,50 professional associations,51 widespread news coverage,52
45

See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics In Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 43 (2009) (indicating that to
restore public confidence in the legal profession in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, in 1974, the American
Bar Association (ABA) mandated that accredited schools “require for all students . . . instruction in the duties and
responsibilities of the legal profession . . . . [Currently almost] all schools require courses in professional
responsibility.”).
46
Cf. Andrew M. Perlman, Margaret Raymond, & Laurel S. Terry, A Survey of Professional Responsibility Courses
at American Law Schools in 2009 (2009), available at http://www.legalethicsforum.com/files/pr-survey-resultsfinal.pdf (indicating that 66.3% of 105 respondents teaching at 77 law schools taught a course in professional
responsibility at least once each academic year and that “the vast majority of respondents regularly teach
professional responsibility.”).
47
See National Conference of Bar Examiners, The MPRE, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited
July 17, 2012) (“The MPRE is required for admission to the bars of all but four U.S. jurisdictions.”); see also Paul
T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1299 (2003) (“In the span of two decades, we have thus seen the flowering of a remarkable phenomenon: the
establishment of a national bar examination on legal ethics in a country in which the states purportedly control bar
admission.”).
48
See LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 21:3004 (2010) (“All of the mandatory continuing legal
education jurisdictions earmark at least one hour each year for ethics education. Some jurisdictions consider ethics
and professionalism to be interchangeable; some impose a separate professional requirement."); see also STEPHEN
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 687 (8th ed. 2009) (indicating that “more than
40 American jurisdictions have mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) requirements . . . [and that most]
jurisdictions require that two or three of these hours be in legal ethics.”).
49
For example, some law journals now focus on issues of lawyer professional responsibility. These include the
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, the University of Alabama’s Journal of the Legal Profession, and the St.
Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice and Ethics. Other law journals frequently publish articles on legal ethics
topics. See Martha Pagliari, Recent Scholarship, in AALS Professional Responsibility Section Newsletter, at 33-37
(Spring 2012) (listing more than 70 articles published between January 1 and May 4, 2012); see also Robert M.
Jarvis, Book Review, J. LEGAL. PROF. 111, 112 (2008) (noting that “the library of legal malpractice materials has
expanded at a rapid rate during the past three decades”).
50
Lawyer magazines, such as the ABA Journal, often contain a monthly ethics column. In addition, some lawyer
publications, such as National Law Journal, law.com, New Jersey Law Journal, and Texas Lawyer, devote
considerable coverage to ethics issues, such as disputes between lawyers and clients, law firm breakups, and court
rulings related to the practice of law.
In many states, lawyers can obtain free advice by phone about ethical issues that arise in the practice of
law. For example, in Texas, a lawyer can call a toll-free number and talk to a professional who specializes in
answering questions related to the disciplinary rules. See State Bar of Texas, Toll Free Attorney Ethics Helpline,
available at
http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics_Helpline&Template=/CM/HTM
LDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15697#toll (last visited July 16, 2012) (discussing the service).
The American Bar Association offers a free service called ETHICSearch. See American Bar Assoc.,
ETHICSearch, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/ethicsearch.html (last visited July 16,
2012). Available to lawyers and legal support personnel, ETHICSearch helps users promptly locate citations to
relevant ABA rules, advisory ethics opinions, and other resources, usually without a cost.
51
The American Bar Association’s Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) operates an active
listserv and regularly holds continuing education conferences that draw attendees representing all segments of the
professional responsibility bar and academia. See Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers,
http://www.aprl.net/ (last visited July 9, 2012). The National Organization of Bar Counsel (NOBC) is a professional
organization of lawyers who investigate and prosecute grievances against lawyers. See National Organization of
Bar Counsel, http://www.nobc.org/ (last visited July 9, 2012). See generally, American Bar Association Center for
Professional Responsibility, Overview,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalism_codes.ht
ml (last visited July 11, 2012) (providing links to prominent legal organizations that have adopted professionalism
standards, creeds, codes, and policies).
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malpractice litigation,53 and vigorous professional discipline.54 Moreover, in the wake of
expanded civil liability for lawyers, “malpractice insurance companies became some of the most
important reviewers and regulators of lawyer conduct.”55
Professional ethical prescriptions which were once merely aspirational principles for
good professional deportment have been transformed into legally enforceable obligations.56
Today, errant lawyers are regularly held liable for misconduct in actions seeking damages,
disqualification, civil sanctions, fee forfeiture, and professional discipline. Moreover, the
principles of American legal ethics reign not just at home but, in some cases, abroad. The
American model of legal ethics is routinely exported around the world57 by a host of Rule of
Law initiatives.58 For example, the American Bar Association conducts legal and judicial ethics
training in places as far flung as Mongolia, Moldova, Indonesia, and Morocco.59 Yet, while the
rise and the reach of American legal ethics are undeniable, so are the signals that there may be
trouble ahead.

III. The Gathering Storm in the Legal Profession and Legal
Education
A. The Tipping Point
There is abundant evidence that the American legal profession (and with it, American
legal education) is at a tipping point, which, if passed, may result in a significant re-configuration
of how, and by whom, legal services are delivered. The portents are everywhere.60 On the one
52

See, e.g., Big-Time Lawyer Who's Imprisoned For Keeping A Teen Sex Slave Suspended From Practice, BUS.
INSIDER, July 12, 2012, 2012 WLNR 14021409 (discussing a New York lawyer who worked in Moscow, Russia);
John Sullivan, In New Jersey, Rogue Lawyers Are on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at 4 (“To many, the
words legal and ethics fit together like an elephant in a bikini, but state courts take attorney discipline
seriously.”); Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Disbarred by Ethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 17, 2007),
www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/us/17duke.html (discussing the necessity of disbarment).
53
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 2004-2007 (2008) (offering a
statistical analysis of legal malpractice claims).
54
See, e.g., Donald R. Lundberg, Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard: An Appreciation, Reminiscence and
Retrospective, RES GESTAE, January/February 2012, at 17 (discussing 27 years of lawyer discipline in Indiana under
Chief Justice Shepard).
55
See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 79.
56
See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 746-48
(1999) (asserting that during the twentieth century the professional ethics of lawyers, judges, politicians, and civil
servants shifted from being “largely personal matters,” where individuals “relied primarily upon religious beliefs
and social mores,” to a very different situation where rules of conduct are “routinely codified in uniform terms and
strictly enforced”).
57
See James E. Moliterno, Exporting American Legal Ethics, 43 AKRON L. REV. 769, 769 (2010) (“Over the past
decade or so, a massive exportation of U.S. lawyer ethics law, primarily to emerging democracies, has been taking
place.”).
58
Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 43, 4546 (2012) (noting that today “volunteers in nongovernmental programs, such as those conducted by the American
Bar Association, the Open Society Institute, and the Salzburg-based Center for International Legal Studies, fan out
across the globe to build the Rule of Law.”).
59
See ABA Rule of Law Initiative, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law.html (last visited July 9,
2012) (discussing programs in foreign countries).
60
See Karen Sloan, One More Task Force on the Legal Profession’s Problems, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 8, 2012)
(describing an American Bar Association task force to examine changes “roiling the law profession and legal
education”); Lauren K. Robel, American Association of Law Schools Presidential Address 2012, AALS News (Feb.
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hand, many persons believe that American law schools are graduating too many new lawyers61 at
too high a price62 with degrees leading to too few jobs.63 On the other hand, practicing lawyers,
including nascent ones laboring under mountains of student loan debt,64 must compete not only
with the endless supply of American lawyers65 and other professionals (e.g., accountants66 and
real estate brokers67), but with various entities (e.g., software companies68 and outsourcing
2012), at 1, 1 (reporting that nine of the top ten law school news stories of 2011 “were arrayed along a fairly narrow
spectrum from dreadful to horrible: breaches of data integrity; calls for Congressional hearings about law school
debt or graduate unemployment; declining applications; high and rising law school costs; lawsuits by graduates; and
claims that legal academics . . . neglect to teach their students how to practice law”).
61
See Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012 (opining that
“law schools . . . have been churning out more graduates than the economy can employ”); see also MORGAN, supra
note 7, at 80 (“Over the past thirty-five years, the American bar has grown more rapidly . . . than in any comparablelength period in history.”). But see Carole Silver, Book Review, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 691, 691 (2012) (noting that
“[c]ritics charge that law school is too expensive, that the three years required to earn the typical J.D. degree is too
long, and that law schools are admitting too many students,” but arguing that, viewed from outside the U.S.,
American legal education is a model for reform).
62
See Karen Sloan, Law School—Still a Dodgy Investment, Analysis Suggests, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 3, 2012 (quoting
Vanderbilt University law professor Herwig Schlunk as stating that today “[l]aw school is a very risk (and
expensive) investment”); Karen Sloan, Think Law School’s Expensive? You Don’t Know the Half of It, NAT’L L.J.,
May 2, 2012 (detailing projections of student loan debt); Karen Sloan, It Gets Worse — Organization
Underestimated Law School Debt, NAT’L L.J., May 4, 2012 (discussing law schools that “low-balled the cost-ofliving figures”).
63
See Karen Sloan, ABA: Only 55 Percent of Law Grads Found Full-Time Law Jobs, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 2012
(“Slightly more than half of the class of 2011 — 55 percent — found full-time, long-term jobs that require bar
passage nine months after they graduated.”); see also Karen Sloan, A Dismal Job Market for Law Grads, NAT’L L.J.,
June 7, 2012 (“Employment rates for the law school class of 2011 hit an 18-year low.”); Ashby Jones, New Lawyers,
Seeking Jobs, Are Advised to Think Small, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2012 (noting that jobs “have been hard for law
graduates to land in recent years due to a nationwide glut of lawyers and a slump in the legal industry since the 2008
financial crisis.”); David Gialanella, U.S. Law School Applications Fall as Legal Job Opportunities Seen Waning,
N.J. L.J., Apr. 10, 2012 (quoting Wendy Margolis of the Law School Admissions Council as suggesting that the
weak legal “job market and economy help explain the downtrend in law school applications”); cf. David Gialanella,
Uncertainty Leads More Firms to Abandon Summer Programs, N.J. L.J., May 25, 2012 (discussing firms electing to
jettison summer associate positions).
The slow down in the American legal job market is similar to problems in other countries. Even in China,
“college graduates are having trouble finding jobs.” Beijing Model Under Stress, China Lacks a Way to Turn
Discontent into Mandate for Reform, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2012.
64
See David Segal, For 2nd Year, a Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012 (noting
the “spreading view that the legal market in the United States is in terrible shape” and observing that “many new
lawyers are struggling with immense debt”). “American students are now more than $1 trillion in debt for their
[undergraduate and graduate] studies.” Alan G. Walker, Keeping Tuition in Reach, READ. UNIV. BUS., June 13,
2012.
65
See Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012 (“In 2009, twice
as many people passed bar exams as there were legal openings.”). Cf. Karen Sloan, Starting Salaries Continue to
Slide as Big Firm Opportunities Dry Up, NAT’L L.J., July 12, 2012 (reporting a “dramatic three-year decline in
starting salaries for recent law graduates”).
66
See Elijah D. Farrell, Note, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the Bar Really
Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 602 (2000) (“[S]ome in the legal profession insist that in many cases their
accounting firm counterparts are already practicing law.”); see also Katherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A
National Tax Bar: An End to the Attorney-Accountant Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 17-23 (2004) (evaluating
precedent holding that preparation of tax returns does not constitute the practice of law).
67
See ARIZ. CONST. art. 26, § 1 (1962) (“Any person holding a valid license as a real estate broker or a real estate
salesman regularly issued by the Arizona State Real Estate Department when acting in such capacity as broker or
salesman for the parties, or agent for one of the parties to a sale, exchange, or trade, or the renting and leasing of
property, shall have the right to draft or fill out and complete, without charge, any and all instruments incident
thereto.”).
68
See Standard Legal, http://www.standardlegal.com/ (last visited July 9, 2012) (offering do-it-yourself legal
forms).
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providers69) who offer law-related products or products, both in the United States and abroad.70
At the same time, ever-faster modes of communication and the trend toward globalization are
increasing and transforming the demands of clients and, as a result, the way that law is
practiced.71 As the business of law metamorphosizes, lawyers face unprecedented challenges,72
such as how to comply with professional obligations when client tasks are outsourced to India
and other parts of the globe,73 when confidential information is stored in the “cloud,”74 when
building a law practice is done through social networking,75 when even firms without a media
presence must have social media policies,76 or when relegated to performing only a limited range
of tasks77 for a client in a world of “unbundled” legal services.78 Adding to these challenges,
“much of the information lawyers have traditionally sold is now freely available on the
Internet.”79

69

Foreign outsourcing providers supply law-related services (e.g., legal document drafting and litigation assistance)
and general office support (e.g., billing and document management). See generally Pangea3,
http://www.pangea3.com/ (last visited July 20, 2012) (offering the services of Indian, U.S. and U.K. attorneys and
scientists and claiming to be the “most experienced provider of high-quality legal outsourcing solutions to Fortune
1000 companies and Am Law 200 law firms”).
70
See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 86-87 (explaining how globalization multiplies competitive pressure on lawyers
and clients).
71
Cf. James Podgers, Come the Evolution, ABA J., July 2012, at 26 (discussing proposals to revise professional
conduct rules to account for impact of the recent technology revolution and globalization on law practice).
72
See Joe Dysart, A Discovery, ABA J., July 2012, at 32 (speculating that failure to stay current on e-discovery
technology “may soon be considered an ethical violation”).
73
See generally Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, United States, in 33a COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, “OUTSOURCING LEGAL SERVICES: IMPACT ON NATIONAL LAW PRACTICES” 283 (2012)
(discussing the ethical issues related to the outsourcing of legal work from the United States).
74
Cf. Catherine Dunn, Why Companies Should Know Where in the World Cloud Data Are Stored, CORP. COUNSEL,
June 12, 2012 (noting privacy and human rights implications). See generally DAVID THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0:
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE (2008) (describing the challenges and opportunities for legal education
created by modern technology).
75
See Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just "Face" It, 41
U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 389-98 (2010) (discussing social networking by practitioners and related ethical issues); see
also Craig Estlinbaum, Social Networking and Judicial Ethics, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 1, 28
(2012) (“Because the canons [of judicial ethics] are imprecise and subject to fact-based applications post hoc, judges
must use extraordinary caution and judgment before participating in an online community.”).
76
See Kenneth L. Hardison, Avoid Social Media Pitfalls, TRIAL, July 2012, at 28, 34 (outlining key directives “for
both postings on the firm’s social media sites and employees’ personal postings that could be attributed to the
firm”); see also John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from Social Media
Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 476-78 (2011) (discussing pertinent ethics opinions).
77
See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 157 (“While firms will prefer to have clients employ several of its practice groups
at once to deal with a matter, firms are likely to find themselves offering partial or ‘unbundled’ services as an
alternative to traditional legal representation.”); id. at 158 (“Unbundling is likely to seem unsettling to lawyers who
formerly did a job from start to finish, but unbundled services will take maximum advantage of the lawyer
specialization that seems likely to be inevitable.”).
78
See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal
Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 166, 188-89
(2012). As Professor Struffolino explains: “The tasks [in legal representation] typically include: “(1) gathering
facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the opposing party, (4) researching the law, (5) drafting
correspondence and documents, (6) negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court . . . . Unbundling can be
either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal unbundling includes limiting the representation to tasks necessary to
accomplish one objective in the pending matter, such as obtaining child support. Vertical unbundling occurs when
the attorney is retained to perform only one or more tasks from the bundle, such as offering advice or drafting a
pleading.”).
79
MORGAN, supra note 7, at 95.

P a g e | 12

Clients forced to match the low prices of international competitors in a “flattened”
world are forcing law firms to reduce the costs of legal services.81 The comfortable salaries of
transactional lawyers, particularly those in elite law firms, are an appealing target for business
clients fixed on cutting expenses.82 Developments in the Far East may hold lessons for the West.
The cost-cutting pressures faced by American law firms practicing in Asia have made it “very,
very hard for firms to make money in the region.”83
In the recent recession, it became increasingly necessary for large law firms to sue their
clients to collect their fees.84 Until lately, that extreme step was usually avoided at all costs for
fear of triggering a retaliatory legal malpractice claim.85 However, many law firms have
concluded that such risks must be incurred to deal with recalcitrant clients who are unwilling to
pay.86
It is not fanciful to ask whether lucrative and seemingly secure portions of the American
legal profession could vanish. That has happened in other fields.87 In recent decades, the once
vibrant Main Streets of American cities and towns were rendered obsolete by the advent of
shopping centers, malls, and discount stores.88 Highly paid industrial workers saw their jobs
80

80

See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6–7 (2005)
(arguing that “the word is flat” in the sense that, in selling goods and services, businesses must compete with
counterparts in other countries).
81
See Alan Cohen, Six Big Law Firms Get Serious About Legal Project Management, N.J. L.J., Aug. 8, 2012
(discussing how clients push firms for efficiency and cost predictability).
82
See Shannon Green, Crunching Law Department Numbers to Reduce Outside Counsel Spending, CORP. COUNSEL,
June 15, 2012 (discussing a program that broadly implemented flat fees in lieu of hourly fees); “Entry” Fee, ABA
J., July 2012, at 33 (“Since the recession, in-house counsel have been increasingly reluctant to pay fees for entrylevel associates.”).
83
Anthony Lin, Still Hungry, THE ASIAN LAWYER, May 1, 2012 (“M&A deals are . . . usually competitively bid and
handled on flat fees far lower than comparable billables on a stateside deal.”).
84
See John Council, Bonus Time? Former Client Alleges He Never Signed Contract to Pay Performance Incentive
Bonus, TEX. LAW., Apr. 11, 2012 (discussing a law firm’s claims for breach of contract, fraud, and fraudulent
inducement); John Council, BAM! Counsel Win $21 Million in Fees From Clients Who Wouldn’t Pay, TEX. LAW.,
Jan. 30, 2012, at 1 (discussing litigation involving “lawyers who did a fantastic job for a client and a client who
didn’t want to pay and alleged everything in the book to get out of paying”); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Texas Firms
File Suits to Pursue Legal Fees, TEX. LAW., Sept. 12, 2011 (discussing several lawsuits to collect fees); Lynne
Marek, Chicago Firm Sues Client Over $747,500 in Fees, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 21, 2010 (opining that “every firm has its
limits” when it comes to nonpayment of fees); see also Former Lawyer for Detroit Mayor Claims Unpaid Fees,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 2008 (discussing a lawsuit to collect fees).
85
Cf. Andrew Longstreth, Ex-Debevoise Client Raises Nasty Counterclaims in Unpaid Bills Case, AMLAW LITIG.
DAILY, Jan. 13, 2010 (discussing a malpractice counterclaim seeking $55 million in damages that was filed in
response to a claim for $6 million in unpaid legal bills).
86
Cf. Ben Present, Judge Criticizes Woman Who Tried to Avoid Attorney Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 12,
2012 (referring to “a strongly worded opinion in favor of a Northeastern Pennsylvania plaintiffs attorney whose
clients . . . tried to avoid paying his contingency fee on a $4.6 million settlement by, among other things, filing a
complaint with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and threatening to call the police”).
87
Cf. Jeff Selingo, Fixing College, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012 (stating that “information industries, from journalism
to music to book publishing, . . . have been transformed by technology, resulting in the decline of the middleman —
newspapers, record stores, bookstores and publishers”).
88
See Peter L. Kilborn, Another Tumble in the Decline of Main Street, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/us/another-tumble-in-the-decline-of-mainstreet.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm ("[A]long most Main Streets, grand old names . . . and scores of one-of-a-kind
speciality shops are long gone, either dead or flown to the shopping centers."). But see Jonathan O’Connel, Main
Street Making a Comeback at the Expense of the Shopping Mall, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/main-street-making-a-comeback-at-the-expense-of-theshopping-mall/2011/11/18/gIQAfnEhfN_story.html (contrasting the recent lack of development of new shopping
centers with a resurgence of interest in “[o]utdoor town center concepts . . . evoking the Main Streets of yore”).
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shipped overseas, as the country’s manufacturing base was decimated. 89 The once-mighty
American railroads, at least in the passenger sphere, disappeared in most places or became living
anachronisms.90 A corporation no less than Eastman Kodak, an erstwhile American icon,
plummeted faster and farther than anyone could have imagined.91 All this occurred in just a few
short decades.
No one who follows current events can doubt that, in terms of economics, the world is
now highly interconnected and that developments on one side of the globe can have
consequences on the other.92 Moreover, there is no reason to think that the American legal
profession is any more immune to the tides of economic change than lawyers in other countries,
such as England, where there have recently been radical changes.93
Some law schools have already begun to downsize. Certain “experts say that the planned
reductions by at least 10 of the roughly 200 laws schools accredited in the U.S. suggest a new
reality is sinking in: The legal profession may never return to its prerecession prosperity.”94
Legal education and the legal profession may be experiencing what amounts to a “big structural
shift.”95 According to Dean Frank Wu of the University of California Hastings College of Law,
“This is Detroit in the 1970s: change or die.”96
The Supreme Court of Washington recently adopted a “Limited Practice Rule for Limited
License Legal Technicians.”97 The Rule permits persons with training as a paralegal or legal
assistant, who have experience working under the supervision of a lawyer, to become licensed as
a legal technician to perform certain tasks for clients.98 Those tasks include a limited, albeit
broad, range of services, such as obtaining relevant facts, informing the client of applicable
procedures and deadlines, providing the client with self-help materials, reviewing and explaining
documents and exhibits, selecting and advising the client about forms, performing legal research

89

See PETER HESSLER, COUNTRY DRIVING: A JOURNEY THROUGH CHINA FROM FARM TO FACTORY 60 (2010)
(describing how an automobile factory was moved from Pennsylvania to China).
90
See generally Billy Colorado, Disappearing Railroad Blues, DAILY KOS (Jan 30, 2011),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/01/30/939949/-Disappearing-Railroad-Blues (discussing the decline of the
American railroad).
91
See Simon Waldman, Kodak: Why the Moment Has Passed, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jan/19/kodak-why-moment-has-passed (noting that Kodak has filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy after "teeter[ing] on the brink of collapse for the best part of a decade").
92
Of course, the idea that that the world is economically interconnected is not new. During the Taiping Uprising in
Qing Dynasty China (1851-64), “Britain’s neutrality in the U.S. Civil War came at the expense of abandoning it in
China.” STEPHEN R. PLATT, AUTUMN IN THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM: CHINA, THE WEST, AND THE EPIC STORY OF THE
TAIPING CIVIL WAR 16 (2012). This was taken as “evidence that the empire at the end of the world was now
connected to the economic and political systems of the West.” Id. at 31. “Karl Marx, in 1853, a London
correspondent for the New-York Daily Tribune . . . [,] considered the rebellion in China to be a sign . . . that
demonstrated the interconnectedness of the industrial world.” Id.
93
See MORGAN, supra note 7, at 90 (discussing the Legal Services Act of 2007).
94
Joe Palazzolo & Chelsea Phipps, Law Schools Apply the Brakes, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2011.
95
See id. (quoting Professor William Henderson of Indiana University).
96
Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012 (quoting Wu); see
also Karen Sloan, It's a Buyers’ Market at Law Schools, NAT’L L.J., June 25, 2012 (“Law schools experienced a 25
percent decline in applicants nationwide during the past two years, . . . [and many] have responded by accepting a
larger percentage of applicants and sweetening their scholarship packages.”).
97
See In the Matter of the Implementation of APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, Order No. 25700-A-1006, 2012 WA REG TEXT 300583 (NS), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2012)
98
Id. R. 28(D)(3) (stating education and experience requirements).
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and drafting (subject review and approval by a Washington lawyer), explaining what other
documents the client may need, and assisting the client in obtaining necessary documents.99
It would be useless to argue that the legal profession should seek to maintain the status
quo because the law of lawyering has matured to the point where legal ethics standards of
conduct and enforcement mechanisms are now reasonably effective. However, it is very
appropriate to ask: how will the goals so thoughtfully advanced by the current regime be
effectively promoted if the now-unitary legal profession fragments into a multitude of legal
services providers? Presumably, in that kind of world, not every provider will be bound by the
same ethics code or subject to the same malpractice principles.

B.

The Vanishing American Lawyer

Professor Thomas D. Morgan’s provocatively named new book, The Vanishing American
Lawyer,100 offers a commanding and perceptive analysis of the gathering storm in both American
legal education and the American legal profession. One of the greatest strengths of that volume,
published by Oxford University Press, is that the intellectual sweep of Morgan’s argument is
accompanied by abundant citations. His description of the forces that are reshaping the
American legal profession is backed by evidence, both contemporary and historical. In many
instances, the facts that are mustered in support of the author’s analysis span decades or even
centuries.
The key premise of The Vanishing American Lawyer is that “lawyers are facing
fundamental changes in both what they will be asked to do and whether the work they once did
will continue to be done by lawyers at all.”101 Morgan asserts that “the ‘lawyer’ role known by
generations of Americans and others is vanishing.”102 His thesis is grounded in a careful
examination of the “the expansion in the number of lawyers, the prohibition of many [traditional]
anti-competitive professional practices, the globalization of lawyer work, and the transformation
of that work by new forms of technology.”103 Morgan also considers “the rising power of inhouse counsel”104 and the “declining significance of licensure and protective regulatory
standards.”105 “It is in the context of these developments that the vision of the lawyer the world
once knew is vanishing.”106
Morgan acknowledges that “[l]egal regulation is not vanishing.” 107 He says that, “indeed,
as society becomes more complex, the place of law in regulating conduct is likely to increase.”108
Yet he asserts that “it does not follow that a system based on law requires lawyers, as we now
know them, to run effectively.”109
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1. Increasing Complexity and Specialization
Morgan argues that “the interaction of law with increasingly complex economic and
social issues will make distinctively legal questions less common and make many of the skills
now honed in law schools less relevant.”110 “[R]eality may require that more persons, not fewer,
have some legal training, but the training of most such persons will almost certainly not be
today’s three-year graduate program designed to produce an all-purpose legal generalist.”111
Amplifying this point, Morgan predicts that “lawyers will likely have to focus their work in those
fields where they can be known as among the best,”112 and that “few lawyers will likely stray far
from the kinds of work they know how to perform extremely well.”113
“Today’s lawyers,” Morgan argues, “will not be unemployable, but for at least significant
parts of their careers, they will be required to develop specialized expertise both in an area of
substantive law, and in the non-legal aspects of their clients’ problems.”114 More ominously,
Morgan ventures, “[t]he future American lawyer is likely to spend his or her career in a perpetual
tournament trying to stand out among a collection of diverse service providers, each offering to
contribute more to a client than they can charge the client for their service.”115
In one of many memorable turns of phrase,116 Morgan assets that “the concept of a
lawyer we have known will become a part of history, along with the knights and mercenaries
who were hired to fight the battles of others in earlier times.”117 While he maintains that the
“direction of change seems inevitable,” he concedes that the “rate of change is harder to
predict.”118 Nevertheless, Morgan predicts that “a major transformation of the American legal
profession can be expected within the next decade or so.”119

2. Educational Heterogeneity
Regarding changes in legal education, Morgan argues that the “homogeneity” represented
by the standard three-year juris doctorate program “should end.”120 He speculates, for example,
that “[a] one-year program involving thinking like a lawyer, legal research and writing, and
perhaps negotiation, . . . might be worked into an undergraduate college program . . . [or] might
represent a first year of post-graduate study leading to a masters of arts degree.”121 He suggests
that “[g]raduates of such a program would be unlikely to hold themselves out as legal advisors,
but such an education might be highly useful . . . to business people trying to understand the way
law impacts their activities.”122 While the latter point is beyond doubt, the former is far from
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clear. What would be more natural, in a world where is it is difficult for the bar to police the
unauthorized practice of law, and where many think that legal services cost too much, than for a
nonlawyer with some significant measure of legal training to offer legal advice at a lower price?
Morgan, a former law school dean at Emory University and former president of the
Association of American Law Schools, now teaches at George Washington University. He
suggests that law schools should once again consider offering a two-year law degree.123 Some
law schools have already taken steps to accelerate completion of a juris doctorate degree, which
has traditionally taken three years to earn.124 While those schools have not reduced the number
of credit hours required for graduation, there may come a point where the American Bar
Association,125 perhaps because of the soaring cost of legal education,126 may be willing to
endorse an “Executive J.D.”127 or similar academic credential that requires something closer to
60 semester credit hours for graduation, rather than the standard 83 to 90 credit hours.128 In fact,
Morgan’ idea may be gaining traction. A recent editorial in The New York Times asserted that
“some law schools are earnestly considering two-year J.D. programs.” 129
Morgan argues that “[e]ven without formal recognition of a two-year degree, . . . such
education might be recognized as a basis for certification to give legal advice and appear before
particular specialized courts.”130 This idea, too, may be plausible. There is precedent in the
administrative sphere. An Executive Order issued by President Bill Clinton encouraged federal
agencies to permit nonlawyers to represent other persons in proceedings before them.131 Some
federal agencies now do so,132 and the same is true in several states.133
123
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visited July 16, 2012) (same).
125
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expenses, and finance expenses) exceeds $200,000).
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Elaborating on the possibilities for fundamentally restructuring legal education—which
include specialization during the third-year of law school,134 significant attention to “non-legal
subjects such as languages, finance, and science,”135 and mid-career certificate programs136—
Morgan explains: “The three-year program might remain the legal education gold standard, at
least until two-year graduates prove their success in the marketplace.”137 “Almost inevitably, the
nation will need far fewer law schools . . . or at least most will need to transform themselves and
their offerings if they want to survive.”138

3. Durable Areas of Practice
Despite the title of Morgan’s book, it seems clear that American lawyers will not vanish,
at least not entirely. Indeed, some segments of the bar are likely to prosper by traversing the
same familiar paths. This may be true of those members of the legal profession who specialize
in criminal or domestic relations law, staff government offices, or handle run-of-the-mill tort
claims for plaintiffs (to the extent that such claims are still viable after ubiquitous “tort
reform”139). In those areas, it is unlikely that there will be a lack of clients. It is also improbable
that such work will be outsourced to another country140 or delegated to persons not licensed to
practice law, at least in matters that involve litigation.141 Cost-cutting pressures may not
fundamentally transform these types of law practice. Morgan himself opines that “[n]egotiation
and litigation of contested matters is likely to remain one of the last places from which American
lawyers will vanish.”142
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However, other varieties of lawyering may radically change. The most obvious candidate is
business representation, particularly as it relates to commercial matters. It is in that area that the
cost-cutting pressures of globalization will be the greatest.

IV. Restructuring Legal Ethics
A. The Goals of Legal Ethics
Although some of the rules of American legal ethics, such as the restrictions on lawyer
advertising and solicitation, may have originated in a desire to discriminate against minorities143
or to protect established lawyers from competition,144 the present regime contains few traces of
that past. The relevant provisions of modern legal ethics have been debated so vigorously, so
often, and in so many fora during the past forty years145 that virtually every rule that has survived
scrutiny and is currently in force can be justified on multiple legitimate grounds.
Before the Clark Report and Watergate,146 legal ethics reform was a low profile endeavor,
often screened from public view.147 The current era stands in sharp contrast. Legal ethics reform
today operates with a high degree of transparency.148 Disclosure and public scrutiny of
proposals are used as means for ensuring that the substantive provisions of the law of lawyering
are consistent with the public interest, just as reporting requirements in government ethics,149 and
statutes mandating open meetings and open records,150 are used today to promote good
government.
143
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information can be made available to the public in a timely fashion. As a result, some disclosure schemes are
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The complex rules of American legal ethics are animated by a variety of important
concerns. Those goals and objectives are so numerous, nuanced, and intertwined that it is not
possible to specify a definitive comprehensive list.151 Nevertheless, it is clear beyond question
that the law of professional responsibility includes standards which are intended to (1) protect
clients from unnecessary harm, (2) encourage legal resolution of disputes, (3) ensure client
control of legal representation, (4) promote honesty and fairness in public and private affairs, and
(5) assure the proper functioning of the justice system.
For example, clients are protected from harm by the disciplinary rules which mandate
lawyer competence152 and diligence,153 prohibit conflicts of interest,154 regulate fee
arrangements,155 limit in-person solicitation, 156 require safekeeping of property,157 and address
the special interests of clients with diminished capacity.158 More broadly, legal malpractice
actions based on negligence and fiduciary-duty principles are intended to protect clients from
deficient practices by lawyers that cause injuries.
Persons are encouraged to resolve disputes through legal channels—legitimate, peaceful
means, not force or violence—in many ways. These avenues include the ethics rules that enable
clients to obtain accurate information about the terms and availability of legal services,159 that
make legal services more readily available to the poor,160 and that encourage clients to consult
lawyers by guaranteeing that their information will be treated as confidential.161
Client control of legal representation is facilitated by the ethics rules that allow clients to
limit the scope of representation,162 require lawyers to communicate material information,163 and
limit the terms upon which a law practice may be sold.164 The same objective is furthered by the
ethical provisions which oblige lawyers to clarify their allegiances when dealing with entity
constituents.165
Honesty in public and private affairs is the basis for numerous ethics rules.166 These
include the standards that require candor to tribunals167 and truthfulness in statements to
others,168 including statements to bar admission and disciplinary authorities. 169
151
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The proper functioning of the administration of justice is fostered by the ethics rules
which promote judicial impartiality by prohibiting improper communications with judges.170
Confidence in the administration of justice is also advanced by the rules imposing special
obligations on prosecutors, 171 limiting trial publicity,172 prohibiting frivolous litigation,173
mandating reporting of misconduct,174 and requiring fair treatment of third persons.175
These five objectives—(1) protecting clients from unnecessary harm, (2) encouraging
legal resolution of disputes, (3) ensuring client control of legal representation, (4) promoting
honesty and fairness in public and private affairs, and (5) assuring the proper functioning of the
justice system—are major goals of American legal ethics. They reflect public policy concerns of
continuing importance. If the legal profession changes in ways that make it difficult or
impossible for professional discipline and malpractice liability to effectively promote these goals,
then any substitute regime for holding legal service providers accountable176 must be judged by
how well it furthers these same objectives. To paraphrase Professor Neil Hamilton, “[t]he
ultimate question is not whether the concepts of a ‘profession’ and ‘professionalism’ in actual
practice are flawed, but whether the alternative . . . is more flawed in serving the public good.”177

B. The Challenges of Professional Disunification
The American legal profession today remains largely unified. In general, law is still
practiced only by lawyers who, because of their monopoly (or near-monopoly) status, are subject
to special obligations and held accountable in disciplinary and malpractice actions. However, if
the profession is transformed by the increasing rendition of legal services by nonlawyers, or by
the emergence of new categories of lawyers who are not fully licensed, the efficacy of the
current legal ethics regime will be seriously challenged.

1. Obstacles to Discipline
Professional discipline can be effective in deterring bad practices and holding deficient
practitioners accountable only if there are clearly developed standards of conduct that can be
used as the basis for education and imposition of sanctions. Moreover, the deterrent effect of
possible disciplinary action is credible only when there is an enforcement authority with
169
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adequate resources and power to thoroughly investigate complaints of misconduct and ensure
that sanctions are imposed regularly and consistently.178
The rendition of legal services by nonlawyers poses obvious problems for the use of
professional discipline as a mechanism for protecting clients and assuring the proper operation of
the legal system. In many instances, as regards nonlawyer practitioners, there will be no welldeveloped code of professional conduct, no authorized and adequately resourced investigative
authority, and no power to impose discipline. Nonlawyers practicing before agencies and
tribunals may be obliged to adhere to codes of conduct adopted by those entities to guide the
conduct of persons who appear in a representative capacity.179 Yet, it seems likely that such
standards will focus only on the most obvious problems, and that agencies will have limited
procedures and resources for the investigation of complaints. Sanctions are likely to be imposed
only in the clearest cases.
The provision of legal services by persons who are not fully licensed poses different
problems than practice by nonlawyers for the maintenance of an effective disciplinary regime. A
process might be structured so that those practitioners not fully licensed would be subject to
some, but not all, of the obligations that bind fully licensed lawyers. The arrangement might be
similar, in certain respects, to that embodied in the terms of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
imposes on part-time judges only some of the many obligations that comprise the law of judicial
ethics.180 However, it would be difficult to decide which of the important obligations in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or more accurately in the parallel state enactments, should
not be binding on lawyers who are not fully licensed. (Confidentiality? Competence?
Reasonable fees? Conflict of interest?) The consumer-friendly course might be to hold all
lawyers licensed by a jurisdiction, in whatever capacity, to the full range of ethical obligations,
though certainly those not enjoying a full license might have grounds to object.
The Supreme Court of Washington’s “Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians,”181 imposes some, but not all, of the obligations traditionally found in legal ethics
codes on legal technicians who are not fully licensed to practice law. A limited license
technician must return client documents,182 protect the confidentiality of client information,183
and refrain from promising “special influence with any court or governmental agency”184 or
misleading the client about the legal technician’s professional skills.185 The Rule further
provides that “Limited License Legal Technicians shall be held to the ethical standards of the
Limited License Legal Technicians’ Rules of Professional Conduct, what shall create an . . .
178
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IOLTA program for the proper handling of funds comings into the possession of the Limited
License Legal Technician.”186

2. Obstacles to Malpractice
In the absence of clearly tortious conduct, such as stealing a client’s money,187 lying to a
client about material matters,188 or sexually abusing a client,189 the viability of a malpractice
action normally turns upon establishing both what the standard of care required on the facts of
the case, and that the standard was violated. In many malpractice actions, the former point is a
hotly debated issue on which expert testimony is elicited by the parties to the dispute.190 In the
absence of persuasive testimony as to what the standard of care demanded, a legal malpractice
action will fail.191
The standard of care for a malpractice suit can be articulated only by reference to
practices and principles so well established that they form a dependable guide for the exercise of
judgment by a jury. It is because of difficulties in establishing an alternative standard of care
that lawyers practicing law in large firms are not held to a different standard of care than solo
practitioners, and that lawyers with twenty years of experience are not held to a different
standard than those who recently entered the profession.192 In most circumstances, there is no
reliable way of establishing what a reasonably prudent large-firm lawyer would do that can be
confidently distinguished from what a reasonably prudent solo practitioner would do, or what a
reasonably prudent lawyer with twenty years experience would do differently than a reasonably
prudent lawyer with much less experience.
Suing nonlawyers for malpractice under traditional principle of negligence and fiduciary
duty would be, in most instances, impracticable because ordinarily it would be impossible to
establish how much care a nonlawyer would use in a particular situation (not to mention the fact
that the relationship between a nonlawyer and a client might but not be deemed to be fiduciary).
Except in the context of representing clients before agencies or tribunals that have adopted
standards of conduct for nonlawyers,193 there would usually be no code of ethics that could be
used as a point of reference for determining what a reasonably prudent nonlawyer would do.194
Moreover, any effort to qualify a witness as a testifying expert on nonlawyer practices and
186
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breast implant litigation).
189
See Kling v. Landry, 292 Ill. App. 3d 329, 339 (Ill. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff who alleged
that her attorney sexually abused her properly stated a claim of battery).
190
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. g (2000) (discussing expert
testimony).
191
See Moore v. Crone, 114 970 A.2d 757, 760 (2009) (affirming a grant of summary judgment to a lawyer because
the plaintiff client failed to adduce expert testimony to establish the standard of care in a legal malpractice action
arising from criminal representation).
192
See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 87-88 (2011) (discussing de facto
specialists and large firm lawyers).
193
See Part IV-B-1.
194
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. g (2000) (explaining the relevance
of ethics rules in malpractice actions).
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obligations would presumably run into serious difficulties as judges perform the important
“gatekeeping” function that requires them to exclude from the courtroom unreliable evidence.195
An alternative would be to hold nonlawyers rendering legal services liable for
malpractice if they fall short of the standard of care that would be observed by lawyers. There is
some precedent196 and scholarship197 supporting this view. However, requiring nonlawyers to
adhere to the same exacting standards that bind lawyers may be unfair in cases where the
nonlawyer has not pretended to be a lawyer or promised to render equivalent services.198
Morgan notes that, “[e]ven today, malpractice insurance companies have an incentive to
audit lawyer compliance with professional standards more rigorously than lawyer disciplinary
commissions will ever do.”199 However, if it not possible to articulate the standard of care for a
malpractice action based on negligence or fiduciary-duty principles, there will be less risk of
liability being imposed on lawyers and reduced reason for insurers to counsel law firms to adopt
risk-reducing practices.

C. Alternative Contract Principles
Professor Morgan minimizes the importance of professional discipline in the emerging
legal world. He opines that “private actions against lawyers who fail to meet the promised
standard are likely to replace formal discipline as the principal regulator of lawyer activity.”200
In a recent article in the St. Mary’s Law Journal, he suggested that contract principles can
provide an appropriate legal regime for holding nonlawyers accountable for deficient conduct.201
This proposal merits careful consideration, not only because it comes from one of the most
respected legal ethics scholars, but because it has a certain natural appeal insofar as tort law and
contract law are both part of the law of private obligations.202 On one hand, obligations are
imposed by law, while on the other they are voluntarily assumed. There are many instances
195

See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 597 (1993)) (indicating that trial judges, in admitting expert testimony, have a gatekeeping responsibility
to “[e]nsure that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand”).
196
See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 891, 900 & n.32
(2009) (citing, e.g., Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Wash. 2002); Buscemi v. Intachai, 730 So. 2d
329, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Webb v. Pomeroy, 655 P.2d 465, 468 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982)) (discussing cases
that have held nonlawyers engaged in legal services to the same professional standard of care as lawyers).
197
See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 91 (2007) (arguing
that non-licensed persons “who engage in the compensated practice of law” should be held to the same standard of
care imposed on licensed attorneys).
198
See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL 891,
903 (2009) (arguing that while “[a]nyone who impersonates a lawyer should be held to the standard of a lawyer[,]”
nonlawyers should not otherwise be held to the same standard of care); id. at 904 (citing Bland v. Reed, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 859, 862 (Ct. App. 1968) (“[W]e consider it improper to hold a non-lawyer practicing before the Commission
to a lawyer’s degree of care . . . .”)).
199
MORGAN, supra note 7, at 231 n.35.
200
Id. at 231.
201
See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 891, 903 (2009)
(“Instead of holding nonlawyers to a tort standard that treats them as if they were lawyers, I suggest we move toward
a contract-based standard that asks what the nonlawyer purported to be competent to do and whether she met a
client's reasonable expectations about the services to be provided. The burden of proof would initially be on the
plaintiff client, and the nonlawyer defendant could show specific disclaimers of experience or limits on work to be
done.”).
202
See Lucinda Furguson, Family, Social Inequalities, and the Persuasive Force of Interpersonal Obligation, 22
INT'L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 61, 64 (2008) (listing formation of a contract and injuring another through negligence as
examples of events that trigger private law obligations).
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where even though a remedy is not available under tort law, contract law will provide a basis for
redress.203

1. Private Ordering and Its Limits
As the law of legal ethics is presently configured, contract principles play an important, but
limited role in affording protection to consumers of legal services. Most significantly, lawyers
and clients are afforded great latitude in defining the scope of the professional relationship and
the extent of a lawyer’s obligations. The parties to the representation can agree, for example,
that the lawyer will be obliged to review whether a document accurately reflects the terms of an
agreement reached by the client and another party, but has no duty to evaluate and advise the
client upon the wisdom of the terms of the settlement.204 A lawyer and client may also agree, in
many instances, that the lawyer has no duty to advise the client on the tax consequences of
actions with legal significance.205 Similarly, a lawyer and client may contractually provide that
the lawyer will handle only one of several matters for which the client might logically decide to
engage legal representation.206
The power of the lawyer and client to order the terms of the relationship between them is
limited in significant respects. The terms of a lawyer-client agreement will be void as against
public policy if they are unlawful,207 unethical,208 or unreasonable in light of the fiduciary nature
of the relationship.209 Thus, a lawyer and client may not agree that the lawyer will assist the
client in a fraudulent enterprise,210 tamper with witnesses or evidence,211 conceal client
perjury,212 or so severely limit the scope of performance as to render incompetent services.213

203

See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876 (1986) (holding the pure
economic losses resulting from damage to a product by a component part are compensable under contract law, but
not in a tort action for negligence or strict liability).
204
See Lerner v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 484 (N.J. App. Div. 2003) (holding that a lawyer did not breach the standard
of care by not performing discovery or investigatory services related to the fairness of a property settlement
agreement because the scope of representation was limited to exclude those services and there was no dispute
relating to the client’s “competence, her general knowledge of the family’s financial and personal affairs, or the
voluntariness of her actions”).
205
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012) (permitting a lawyer and client to limit the scope of
representation); Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891, 907
(2009) (“If a lawyer wishes to help a client get a divorce but not take responsibility for tax implications of the
settlement, for example, [Model] Rule 1.2(c) expressly permits that arrangement.”). But see 4 RONALD E. MALLEN
& JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 35:4 (2012 ed.) (noting that failure to stipulate “whether tax advice is
within the scope of the engagement” is a recurring error frequently leading to legal malpractice claims).
206
See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal
Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALP. & ETHICS 166, 188-89
(2012) (discussing vertical and horizontal “unbundling”).
207
See Keliin v. Petrucelli, 499 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that attorney-client agreements
solicited in violation of Michigan law are void).
208
Cf. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 765, 776-783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that an attorney’s conflict of
interest and other ethical violations were sufficient to render an attorney-client agreement void).
209
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19(1)(b) (2000) (“[A] client and lawyer may
agree to limit a duty that a lawyer would otherwise owe to a client if: (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in
the circumstances.”); In re Egwim, 291 B.R. 559, 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding that, in bankruptcy
proceedings, an “attorney's representation ordinarily must extend to all matters relating to the relief sought by the
chapter 7 debtor, and particular services required to pursue that relief normally cannot be excluded”).
210
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”).
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2. Promises are Not Default Principles
While contract law allows for private ordering of the lawyer-client relationship, it does little
to supply default principles to guarantee adequate performance of legal services. As in most
other contexts, the buyer must think about the risks and bargain for desired protection.214 In the
absence of an express promise by the provider, there is little chance that the recipient will be able
to sue for breach of contract.215 A claim against a lawyer may be based on nonperformance of an
implied promise, 216 but that possibility is more theoretical than real. Few malpractice actions for
breach of contract have been founded upon obligations not proven to have been expressly
stated.217
Occasional judicial decisions have allowed jurors leeway in deciding what was promised by
a lawyer to a client. For example, in Pierce v. Cook,218 a lawyer, who was jointly representing a
husband, wife, and child on personal injury claims, commenced an affair with the wife during the
representation. The Supreme Court of Mississippi allowed the husband and child to recover a
substantial malpractice judgment based in part on a breach of contract theory, holding that it was
for the jurors to decide what promises had been made by the defendant lawyer. 219 However,
decisions like Pierce are notable not because they are common, but because they are so rare. A
client who fails to bargain for particular performance by a lawyer typically has little chance of
prevailing in a contract-based malpractice action.

3. Deficiencies in the Contract Model
The question then is whether contract law principles, which are so seldom a basis for lawyer
liability, might somehow play an important role in assuring that nonlawyers and lawyers who are
not fully licensed are deterred from causing harm to clients and held accountable for deficient
conduct. A negative answer to this query is strongly suggested by five factors, including the

211

Cf. Former Prince George's County Executive Disbarred in D.C., The BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, available at
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/07/former-prince-georges-county-executive-disbarred-in-dc.html (last visited
July 13, 2012) (reporting that a lawyer was disbarred based on attempted extortion and witness tampering).
212
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012) (“A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative
proceeding and who knows that a person . . . has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding
shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
213
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (2012) (“[A]n agreement for a limited representation does
not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation.”).
214
See Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 813-26 (2006)
(“[I]ndividuals are the best judges of their own interests; individuals maximize those interests through contracts; the
expectation and reliance interests created by contracts deserve protection; promoting private contracting produces a
social benefit; contract law provides the framework through which the individual and social benefits are realized in
practice.”).
215
See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:6 (2012 ed.) (listing breach of an
express promise as a requirement for a breach of contract cause of action); see also G.K. Las Vegas Ltd. P’ship v.
Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP, 947 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30-31 (App. Div. 2012) (denying recovery for “breach of an
alleged oral agreement to have a particular attorney . . . serve as lead counsel . . . [because] the client failed to
preserve its arguments that the law firm did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the client fully understood the
terms of the parties' retainer agreement”).
216
See generally id. § 8:7 (discussing implied contracts in the context of legal malpractice claims).
217
See id. § 8:6 (“The prevailing rule is that there is no cause of action for breach of an express contract unless the
wrong sued for is breach of a specific promise.”).
218
992 So. 2d 612 (Miss. 2008).
219
Id. at 618.

P a g e | 26

unrealistic prospect of clients bargaining for protection,220 the absence of implied warranties for
services,221 problems of proof,222 limited damages,223 and inconsistent client treatment.224

a.

Unrealistic Bargaining

It would be difficult or impossible—not to mention prohibitively expensive—for clients to
bargain with legal services providers for the level of protection currently afforded by the law of
negligence. This is true for several reasons.
The reasonable care standard that is the centerpiece of the law of negligence incorporates,
through expert testimony, many of the numerous professional obligations that are articulated in
ethics codes.225 Those duties include, but are certainly not limited to, competence,226
communication,227 confidentiality,228 loyalty,229 safekeeping of client property,230 and
transactional fairness, relating both to fees231 and other pecuniary matters.232 It would be the
rare client who thought to address all of those matters in a contract with a legal services
provider.233 And even if client knew that those matters are important, the bargaining process
would be excessively tedious and costly. Merely addressing the numerous varieties of conflict of
interest that can threaten a legal services provider’s loyalty to the client would be an exhausting
undertaking. Quite likely, in the wide range of circumstances, important matters would be
unaddressed, and there would be no promise by the provider that could form the basis for a suit
for breach of contract.
Holding nonlawyers, or lawyers not fully licensed, to a “do what you promise”234 standard
would, in many instances, amount to hollow protection.235 In proposing that standard, Morgan
seems to be thinking more about what constitutes professional competence than about what
comprises the broad fabric of ethical obligations that amount to such a large part of what protects
220

See Part IV-C-3-a.
See Part IV-C-3-b.
222
See Part IV-C-3-c.
223
See Part IV-C-3-d.
224
See Part IV-C-3-e.
225
See Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 929
(2007) (explaining why disciplinary rules are highly relevant to any assessment of what the standard of care
requires).
226
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (“Competence”).
227
See id. R. 1.4 (“Communication”).
228
See id. R. 1.6 (“Confidentiality of Information”)
229
See id. R. 1.7—1.10 (dealing with conflicts of interest).
230
See id. R. 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”).
231
See id. R. 1.5 (“Fees”).
232
See id. R. 1.8(a) (dealing with business transactions between lawyers and clients).
233
But see MORGAN, supra note 7, at 25 (arguing that “many clients today are able to—and do—evaluate and direct
their lawyers”).
234
See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891, 905 (2009)
235
The question of whether contract-based malpractice actions can effectively replace tort-based malpractice actions
is related to the debate that has been raging recently around the so-called “economic loss rule.” The question there
is whether purely economic losses should be remedied only under contract law and not under tort principles. In that
debate I have argued that: “Tort law can offer a more efficient path than contract law to deterring and compensating
some forms of economic harm . . . . Relegating persons to exclusively contract remedies for purely economic losses
will effectively immunize defendants from liability in a wide range of cases. This is undesirable for, in many cases,
unnecessary economic harm should be deterred through legal principles that create an incentive for safe practices
through risk of liability.” Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 523, 582-83 (2009).
221
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clients from harm. Morgan recognizes the possible disadvantage for clients, but sees the
alternative as worse. Morgan states, “The fact is that lawyers can often do a sufficiently better
job than nonlawyers and my standard may leave some clients with a reduced standard of
protection. I suggest—and leave to others’ evaluation—however, that nonlawyer representation
will, on balance, tend to be better than no representation at all. And the latter, I fear, will be
many potential clients’ only realistic alternative to nonlawyer assistance.”236

b.

Absence of Implied Warranties

It seems doubtful that the law of warranties could fill the gap in legal protection left by the
failure of clients to bargain for protection with a legal services provider. First, American law
generally distinguishes between goods and services. Warranties are implied for goods, but not
for services.237 For example, the Uniform Commercial Code, which imposes warranties for
merchantability238 and fitness for a particular purpose, 239 applies only to sales of goods. 240 The
UCC protections do not apply to sales of services,241 or even to mixed sale-service transactions,
if those transactions are predominantly for the provision of services, not goods. 242
While there may be some commodity-like aspects to the rendition of legal services, what
providers do characteristically involves the exercise of judgment243—judgment about which facts
are relevant, what legal principles apply, or how best to protect or advance the interests of the
client.244 Thus, it is highly unlikely that a lawyer or other legal services provider would be held
liable to a client for breach of an implied warranty under principles such as those embodied in
the UCC, or its international transaction counterpart, the Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, 245 to which the United States is a party. 246
Moreover, even if legal services providers were held liable for “unmerchantable” services,
there would be a myriad of unanswered questions as to what that means. Are law-related
236

Id. at 906-07.
Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 315 (providing implied warranties for goods) with 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-2 (5th ed. 1996) (“Code provisions on warranties and related
obligations do not apply to contracts which are purely for services.”). See also Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v.
Lubbock County Hosp. Dist., 987 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. 1998) (noting that an implied warranty for services will not
be found “in the absence of a demonstrated, compelling need”); 1 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE
LAW OF PROD. WARRANTIES § 2:18 (2011); (“[T]here are no implied warranties for service contracts outside article
2 [of the U.C.C.].”). But see Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992) (“Courts in a number of jurisdictions have recognized an implied warranty in service contracts.”).
238
U.C.C. § 2-314.
239
Id. § 2-315.
240
Id. § 2-102.
241
See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. America v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Wis. 2004) (“[T]he U.C.C.
does not apply to service contracts.”).
242
See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that contracts are excluded from the UCC if the
predominant factor of the contract is “the rendition of service”).
243
Cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3, 61, 93 (1993)
(asserting that “it is this quality of judgment that the ideal of the lawyer-statesman values most” and explaining
“excellence of judgment”).
244
See Paul F. Kirgis, The Knowledge Guild: The Legal Profession in an Age of Technological Change, 11 NEV. L.J.
184, 197 (2010) (“The output of lawyers is a stew of intangibles consisting of expertise, judgment, process skills,
and the like. These ‘knowledge goods’ are different from tangible goods.”).
245
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M.
668.
246
U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods: Official English Text,
52 Fed. Reg. 6262-02 (Mar. 2, 1987).
237
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services “unmerchantable” if the provider has a conflict of interest, or fails to disclose material
facts, or is unaware of relevant legal principles? The law of legal ethics presently talks about
these issues under malpractice rubric drawn from the law of negligence and fiduciary duty, but
virtually never under the language of warranty. Consequently, there is no existing body of legal
services warranty precedent that could even begin to inform how warranty principles could be
applied to nonlawyers or lawyers not fully licensed.

c.

Problems of Proof

Relegating clients to remedies under contract principles would also entail problems of proof.
An aggrieved client would presumably bear the burden of proving that a promise was in fact
made.247 Unsophisticated clients would often not have thought about the advisability of
memorializing the terms of the contract in writing. Yet, absent such corroborating documentary
evidence, a breach of contract action will be nothing more than the word of the client against the
provider. This reality would not only undercut the efficacy of contract law remedies for
individual clients, but the likelihood that a judgment would deter bad practices by other legal
services providers.
Presumably, sophisticated clients, such as corporations, would be able to anticipate the need
to bargain for contractual assurances and memorialize such obligations.248 Yet, an effective legal
ethics regime cannot be built on the assumption that all clients will be sophisticated and able to
engage in adequate self-protection.

d.

Limited Damages

Another disadvantage of relegating clients to contract law remedies is the fact that contract
law damages are typically less generous than recoveries under tort law. In many instances,
consequential damages are deemed to be insufficiently foreseeable to be awarded under contract
principles, even though the same damages might be levied in a tort action under ordinary rules of
proximate causation. Consequently, clients may be undercompensated if forced to seek redress
in an action for breach of contract.
Punitive damages are almost never recoverable under contract law. 249 Yet, despite a host of
relatively recent state250 and federal251 law restrictions, punitive damages still play an important
247

See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in A World of Amateurs, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 891, 903 (2009)
(“I suggest we move toward a contract-based standard that asks what the nonlawyer purported to be competent to do
and whether she met a client's reasonable expectations about the services to be provided. The burden of proof would
initially be on the plaintiff client, and the nonlawyer defendant could show specific disclaimers of experience or
limits on work to be done.”).
248
Cf. SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 26-27 (1994) (“Consumers have no way to know whether a lawyer can promise (let alone
deliver) value for money”).
249
See, e.g., Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 & n.4 (Wis. 2005) (“Tort law generally offers a
‘broader array’ of damages than contract. . . . For example, punitive damages and attorney fees are sometimes
available in tort actions, but generally cannot be had in breach of contract claims.”); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 574
(“Punitive damages . . . are not available as a remedy for breach of contract, without an underlying tort.”).
250
In some jurisdiction set a high threshold for an award of punitive damages. For example, a Texas statute
provides: “(a) . . . [E]xemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the harm with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages results from: (1)
fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence . . . . (d) Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the jury was
unanimous in regard to finding liability for and the amount of exemplary damages.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 41.003 (Westlaw 2012). See Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. 2009) (finding no evidence that a
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role in tort litigation arising from egregious conduct.252 Any diminution in the exposure of legal
services providers to punitive damages liability would undercut the deterrent effect of the law in
terms of discouraging abusive practices by other providers.
The mere replacement of the present workhorse malpractice cause of action for negligence
with contract-based liability would have little effect on the availability of punitive damages
because ordinary negligence is never a predicate for a punitive damages award.253 Presumably,
legal services providers would still be subject to tort liability for highly blameworthy conduct,
such as fraud, conversion, and the tort of outrage.254 However, in some jurisdictions, such as
Texas,255 gross negligence is a sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages. If the
substitution of contractual recovery for negligence liability eliminates the ability of clients to
hold legal services providers liable for gross negligence under circumstances not amounting to
another tort that warrants an award of punitive damages, that would make the law less effective
in protecting clients.

e.

Inconsistent Client Treatment

One of the great virtues of American legal ethics is that the rules tend to ensure a
minimum level of performance in the rendition of legal services and consistent treatment of
clients. Thus, for example, under the present regime, even without bargaining for it, every client
enjoys safeguards related to the handling of personal information256 and property,257 and every
lawyer must measure up to the standard of competent performance.258 This not only increases
the chances of individual client satisfaction by reducing the opportunities poor performance and
abuse, it also builds confidence in the legal system.
Clients know that lawyers must play by the “rules of the game,” even though those clients
may have little understanding about what those rules provide. As the result of the existence of
law firm that gave allegedly defective advice to an estate executor intended to cause injury or acted with actual
awareness of an extreme risk of harm, and that therefore there was no basis for a punitive award.
Many jurisdictions have capped the amount of punitive damages that may be recovered from a defendant,
either in tort actions generally or in legal malpractice suits in particular. Alaska generally restricts a punitive award
to the greater of three times compensatory damages or $500,000. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020(f) (Westlaw
2012) (ordinarily allowing three times compensatory damages or $500,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-102
(Westlaw 2012) (providing that punitive damages may not exceed actual damages or, if there are aggravating
circumstances, three times the amount of actual damages).
251
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (stating that defendant's
reprehensibility is “[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award”).
252
See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding the punitive award of
five million dollars to a young employee who was forced to strip in front of McDonald's managers as part of a hoax).
253
See 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 4:11 (3d ed. 1997) (“What is manifestly evident from
the authorities is that mere or ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive damages.”).
254
See generally Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 56
(2012) (“While most IIED claims against attorneys fail, predicting whether a particular attorney's actions will be
determined to have crossed the line into “extreme and outrageous” conduct is sometimes at least as difficult as it is
with respect to other defendants”).
255
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004) (requiring “(1) fraud; (2) malice; or
(3) gross negligence”); see also Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 662 (Tex. 2012) (“In a typical
negligence case like medical malpractice, to recover exemplary damages a plaintiff must simply prove that the
defendant was not merely negligent, but was grossly negligent or acted intentionally in causing the serious harm that
is the subject of the cause of action.”).
256
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012) (“Confidentiality”).
257
Id. R. 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”).
258
Id. R. 1.1 (“Competence”).
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disciplinary and malpractice principles, clients can and do expect, in usually a vague and
imprecise way, that, unless a special bargain has been struck, every lawyer-client relationship
comes with all of the “standard equipment.” One consequence of this arrangement is that the
legal system tends to be viewed as legitimate. In a very real sense, clients enjoy a degree of
equality before the law because everyone’s lawyer must conform to the same standards and
operate within the same restrictions.
The legitimacy of the legal system is crucial for many reasons. Among other things, it
facilitates the peaceful resolution of disputes, reduces the transaction costs of hiring an attorney,
and builds respect to the judgments of the courts.
Under a legal ethics regime based predominately on contract law principles—rather than
negligence and fiduciary-duty law and disciplinary standards of conduct—it would be
considerably more difficult for legal principles to ensure that the clients would be treated equally.
The applicable admonition would be “buyers beware.” In that environment, it would be harder
for the legal system to operate in a way that enjoys the confidence and respect of the citizenry.

V.

Conclusion

Despite its apparent vitality and comprehensive structure, the field of American legal
ethics is vulnerable to the forces of change. A looming transformation of the legal profession,
catalyzed in large measure by technological innovations and globalization, threatens to undercut
the central pillars of the current ethics regime. If legal services are increasingly provided to
clients by nonlawyers, or by lawyers who are not fully licensed, it will be ever more difficult for
the legal system to rely on disciplinary codes and malpractice actions to hold those who provide
legal services accountable and to deter improper practices. To the extent that ethics rules and
principles of negligence law and fiduciary duty are rendered irrelevant, or less operative than
they are today, by professional disunification, it will be necessary to find a substitute legal
regime to protect clients from harm and facilitate the proper operation of the justice system.
It seems doubtful that contract law principles can meet this challenge. Contract law
offers no great repository of client protection principles, but rather an array of rules which do as
much to limit obligations as to create them. The weak and unsophisticated are unlikely to be
protected by contractual principles from those who would take advantage or were more loyal to
promoting other interests.
Rights under contract law would, of course, be supplemented by tort principles that
impose liability for deception via actions for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Those torts
would undoubtedly provide import protection from serious forms of harm. Yet, it must be
remembered that it is difficult to plead and prove fraud. Relevant principles have sometimes
been so uncharitably construed by courts as to provide no remedy to deliberately deceived
investors.259 So, too, actions for negligent misrepresentation often offer only a surprisingly
narrow range of recovery.260 Even deceptive trade practices acts, which were originally intended
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to simplify the requirement of parallel common law principles, have been reformed in many
states in ways that limit their application to harm arising from the provision of legal services.261
Thus, if the present legal ethics regime falls due to changes in the way law is practiced, it
is not clear what legal substitute could effectively take its place. That unanswered challenge will
need to be addressed with the same energy and dedication with which the current matrix of
substantive standards and enforcement mechanisms was built, largely from scratch, during the
past fifty years.262 Presumably, if the challenge could be met once, it can be met again. In
another fifty years, the field of American legal ethics may look very different than it does today.
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